Affective politics of the far right beyond negative emotions

Julia Leser & Florian Spissinger

Chairman of far-right AfD party parliamentary group in Thuringia Bjoern Hoecke speaks during a demonstration of the anti-immigrant Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident), on February 17, 2020 in Dresden, eastern Germany. (Photo by STRINGER / AFP) (Photo by STRINGER/AFP via Getty Images)

In Germany, right-wing terror is on the rise. In the past years, events such as the 2016 mass shooting in a Munich shopping mall, the knife attack on politician Henriette Reker in 2015, the murder of Walter Lübcke and the attack of a synagogue in Halle in 2019, and the most recent terror attack in Hanau in February 2020 have left the country reeling. In light of these events, a wide range of liberal to conservative politicians and observers have issued public statements that condemn sentiments of hatred that are thought of as motivating these violent crimes. ‘Hate is a poison that… is responsible for far too many crimes,’ said chancellor Angela Merkel after the Hanau shooting.  Others have explicitly accused the far-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) of fueling hate that would lead to an increase in right-wing violence. The AfD should be considered ‘the political arm of hate,’ said Green party member Cem Özdemir in a recent interview, while AfD politicians have been vehemently protesting the accusations and denying any connections between their politics, the dissemination of hate and the rise in terror attacks in Germany.

The idea of hatred as a central factor in fueling the rise of right-wing terror seems plausible at first. The simplicity of this explanation for such a complex phenomenon might be attractive, but on a closer look, it raises more questions than answers. Can a sentiment be responsible for an act of terror? Is it solely hatred that operates in far-right politics? Is hatred more than a cipher for anti-Muslim racism? Kenan Malik has written in the Guardian that it is ‘not a general problem of “hatred” but the specific vilification of migrants and Muslims.‘ This raises the question of how far-right discourse, racism, sentiment and violence are interconnected. In other words, if we think of right-wing terrorists being motivated mainly by ‘irrational’ sentiments and delusions, we might miss the complexities of how far-right rhetoric and racism are increasingly normalized, how people are actually radicalized, and what these processes have to do with emotions. This invites us to rethink some of our assumptions about the role of negative emotions such as hatred in politics.

The far right in particular is perceived as an affective space that harnesses and amplifies a multiplicity of ‘negative’ emotions, among them not only hatred, but also fear, rage and anger.

Concerning the role of emotions in politics in general, it is quite common to frame emotions in negative terms as a manifestation of undesirable, irrational, illegitimate or even dangerous political conduct. In line with certain traditions of liberal political philosophy, ‘good’ politics is conceived as a realm that is guided by rationality and freed of emotions. Such normative thinking positions affects as ‘the other’ of rational politics and therefore considers them to be apolitical, alarming, or irrational. In this context, ascribing affectivity to a political adversary can operate as a mode of devaluation and delegitimisation. The far right in particular is perceived as an affective space that harnesses and amplifies a multiplicity of ‘negative’ emotions, among them not only hatred, but also fear, rage and anger. In light of the recent events in Germany, it becomes obvious that we continue to think of far-right agents as innately hateful. Yet ‘hateful’ is not something that people just are, and hate is not something that people simply do. In this regard, Sara Ahmed has argued in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2014) that no object is innately hateful, as affects are not private properties of particular individuals. Rather, a social object has to be made ‘hateful’ through the circulation of affects. This is also true for those who are deemed to be fueling hate, as they are themselves objects of affective ascriptions in rational discourse. As Kathleen Blee has demonstrated in her work Understanding Racist Activism (2018), hate rather needs to be considered as a relational and socially constructed phenomenon that can operate in the realm of politics in different ways.

In our ethnographic research on the far-right populist party AfD in Germany, we were less interested in identifying the negative affects that characterize their politics, and more interested in what affects can or are able to do, for whom, how and why – an approach that is inspired by the works of Nitzan Shoshan (The Management of Hate, 2016), Kathleen Blee (Understanding Racist Activism, 2018) and Hilary Pilkington (Loud and Proud: Passion and Politics in the English Defence League, 2016). At the beginning of our ethnographic research, we were surprised about the fact that neither the AfD events that we attended nor our conversations with AfD-affiliated persons were characterized by open articulations of hatred towards those who would be considered non-German. In this regard, Shoshan (2016) and Blee (2018) have argued that hatred in far-right politics operates as a pejorative classification that impacts those who are classified as ‘hateful’. In our research, hate was a feeling that members and supporters of the AfD refrained from expressing explicitly.

According to Blee (2018: 69), all emotions are ‘socially and politically encouraged (or forbidden)’ to some extent. Following Arlie Russell Hochschild (Strangers in Their Own Land 2016: 15), political realms are governed by ‘feeling rules’ that dictate how one should feel about particular political and social issues. In many contexts, expressions of hatred are socially sanctioned or at least discouraged, which indicates a social disagreeability of particular affective expressions. In this regard, far-right political agents tend to disguise and mitigate their rhetoric of exclusion and use more appropriate and legitimate forms to express far-right attitudes. Emotions are never only personal, subjective or intimate, as they are always political. The act of performing emotions in the political realm is inextricably related to their legitimacy. Based on our observations, the performance of legitimate political conduct was crucial for the AfD to transfer their messages to audiences and thus create a social space in which relations, identifications and attachments could emerge and flourish.

An election campaign poster of Germany’s AfD (Alternative for Germany) is seen in Hamburg, northern Germany, on February 12, 2020. (Photo by Patrik Stollarz / AFP) (Photo by PATRIK STOLLARZ/AFP via Getty Images)

In our Global Discourse article, ‘The functionality of affects: conceptualising far-right populist politics beyond negative emotions‘, we analyse in detail how far-right populist parties such as the AfD are actively working to provide appealing political narratives and identities as well as create spaces and opportunities for people to certify and affirm their beliefs by performing and practicing affects. In particular, we demonstrate how these efforts rely on the performance of irony and cynicism, of mockery and cheerfulness, and on creating atmospheres that are inviting and identifiable by sharing jokes and laughter. Hatred was a concept that all AfD politicians and supporters we talked to distanced themselves from. ‘We don’t stir up any hatred,’ they told us, or: ‘It is not us who hate, but the others.’ By ‘the others’ they referred to political opponents they felt delegitimized by, even insulted, discredited, and excluded. Both the distancing against ‘being hateful’ and the humorous good atmosphere performed at AfD gatherings can be interpreted as inherently related; both practices serve to create an appealing AfD community. Affects pervade narratives and practices, creating collective identities, separating groups from one another and putting them in order: ‘It is not us who hate, but the others.’. As Sara Ahmed (2014: 209) said, emotions do things.

A closer examination of the far right’s affective practices and performances could clarify how these agents render their political projects identifiable and appealing. To do so, we argue that instead of addressing their politics of negative emotions – such as hatred and fear – which classify their projects as illegitimate from the outset, we need to understand how they enact themselves as politically legitimate through affective practices that enable opposition to ascribed negativity. We are just beginning to understand the role of affects in politics in general, and in the rise of far-right politics across the globe in particular.

Julia Leser holds a PhD in Political Science (Leipzig University). Currently, Julia is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Leipzig University and affiliated with the BMBF-funded research project ‘Strangers in Their Own Land?’ (Leipzig University), the BMBF-funded research project ‘Beyond the Glass Ceiling’ (TU Darmstadt, HAWK Hildesheim/Holzminden/Göttingen), and the DFG-funded research project ‘Institutionalizing Human Trafficking: A French-German Comparison’ (Leipzig University). Julia’s research focuses on the politics of policing and the politics of affects, and further include national security and migration control, nationalism, populism, political ethnography and state theory.

Florian Spissinger holds a M.A. in Political Science (Leipzig University). Currently, Florian is a research associate at Leipzig University and affiliated with the BMBF-funded research project ‘Strangers in Their Own Land?’. He is a PhD student with a scholarship of Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Florian’s research focuses on the politics of affects, political ethnography, far-right discourse and nationalism, as well as studies on dis/-ability and inclusion.

Populism and the African Region: Potential Dangers

J.A. Doma

NDC Rally – Image by Jarreth Merz

Populism has taken flight throughout the world today, and despite an aggressive response primarily in the media, the populist movement has surged on. With recent European Parliamentary elections all but highlighting that far-right populist parties had become a mainstay in Europe as IvanKrastev has highlighted in the New York Times, one is compelled to imagine what a populist Europe means for the rest of the world. With the United States (U.S.) all but lost, except for a much-changed outcome in the 2020 presidential election, the global order and balance of power is most certain to be transformed, with the developing world once again being the greatest losers. Some of the consequences of growing populism throughout the world have been identified, for example, Max Bergmann, Carolyn Kenney, and Trevor Sutton have highlighted the dangers of the rise of far-right populism to global democracy and security. In particular, of concern to me is the potential impact of populism on the African region. While the liberals of the international community have failed to respond adequately to rising populist movements, there has been a subtle and quiet convergence of a coalition of the radicals. This coalition is set to upset the way things are done today, all to the detriment of the most disadvantaged regions of the world.

With the United States (U.S.) all but lost… the global order and balance of power is most certain to be transformed

Already, Paul Rogers and Richard Reeve in a report titled Climate Change, Populism and National Security have highlighted that many countries usually consider climate change (in)security in terms of how it directly affects national security. Today, many governments especially of the populist kind, have persistently understated the dangers posed by climate change. From current indications, the world may not be able to deliver on the agreements reached in Paris. Already, many African countries are negatively being impacted by a changing climate, with no African country possessing the resources and the ability to mitigate climate change, Africa’s hope solely rests on global action. However, global action will be difficult to attain when some of the world’s most influential nations are climate change cynics. A coalition of populist nations, driven by skepticism in climate change will greatly undermine efforts against climate change, and the first casualties will be regions who contribute little to no carbon emissions – African countries and other developing nations. Ian Dunlop and David Spratt’s recent climate change report has highlighted the horrors the world might face in the coming three decades if fast action is not taken. This implies that action to tackle populism must equally be implemented rapidly.

While we are able to infer Chinese intentions in the region, we will never be able to tell with all certainty what their objectives are.

Similarly, as populist nations continue to gain ground, and as they begin to adopt protectionist policies in international trade, once again the African region is left at the mercy of poor global economic choices. Sino-African relations today is at an all-time high, and has sparked intense debate on the intentions of the Chinese for Africans. Martin Wolf has argued in a Financial Times essay titled The Looming 100-year US-China conflict,that as America and possibly its allies in Europe continue to antagonize Beijing, the rest of the world is set to have to leave with the consequences. In the face of populism, African countries will find it impossible to resist Chinese advances. While numerous literatures have defended China-Africa engagements as a win-win, numerous others consider Beijing’s encroachment as neo-imperialist in nature. Presently, Trump’s America has greatly reduced aid to developing nations, rhetoric from western populist nations has further dampened the confidence of the global south in the global north, compelling developing states to see China as an increasingly more attractive partner. While we are able to infer Chinese intentions in the region, we will never be able to tell with all certainty what their objectives are. The west has continually served as an important check to Chinese advances in the African region, however, as these countries adopt more nationalistic values, their waning interest in Africa will pave the way for the Chinese to take full control of affairs.

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, March 31, 2015

Once consequence of this will probably leave the region financially worse off. Historically, colonialism and imperialism has left the region underdeveloped, and its people in great poverty. If the Chinese were to thread similar paths as Africa’s colonial lords or imperialist partners, the region will further be underdeveloped. Furthermore, one is compelled to contemplate what a Chinese global leadership will imply for Africa’s growing and fragile democracy. The Chinese model has continually been mooted as an alternative path to growth and development for poor countries, in the face of neglect from western states, African nations maybe compelled to do away with democratic values believing that the Beijing system maybe more suitable to their developmental needs.

The political structure of the African region has always sought to emulate western nations, and has indeed made progress albeit gradually.

I am additionally curious as to how current populist trends would affect regional and global integrations. While the African Union (AU) and most especially the United Nations (UN), are not as politically integrated as the European Union (EU), their relevance nonetheless for the world and the African region can not be understated. Britain has begun processes of formally exiting the EU, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally Party has unequivocally vowed to attempt to withdraw France from the European organization, many more governments have hinted on their desire to leave the EU. However, writing in the Washington Post, Chico Harlan has suggested that after watching the strenuous processes Britain has undergone in an attempt to leave the EU, many countries seem to have had a change of heart on taking a similar path. With a possible coalition of radical western nations gradually and silently emerging, united by their nationalistic sentiments, harsh immigration policies, and an aversion to integration, the chances of European disintegration persists. The political structure of the African region has always sought to emulate western nations, and has indeed made progress albeit gradually. With the collapse of the EU and a weakened UN, African states would be left lost and looking to be rescued.

J. A. Doma holds a BA in Politics and International Relations from Lancaster University Ghana. Doma is a scholar of African politics, and is currently a volunteer advocate for the implementation of SDGs in Nigeria. Doma is seeking to pursue an MA around International Relations, Security, Conflict and Peace.

Failure of progressive politics and the rise of a new ‘dangerous’ India

Idreas Khandy 22.05.19

The largest electoral exercise in the world –17th parliamentary elections of India – concluded on the 19th of this month. The mammoth task was carried out over 39 days and in 7 phases to decide the fate of 543 parliamentary seats. At the time of writing, the first post-poll surveys have begun to make rounds in the media. According to these post-poll surveys, the incumbent Narendra Modi led NDA (National Democratic Alliance) is all set to return to power; the accuracy of these surveys remains to be seen. Regardless of which party takes power, it is vital we pay attention to what these elections mean for the world’s largest electoral democracy in times of fake news, and the resurgence of chauvinism in the realm of high politics.

A tale of two manifestos:

To understand any election, a comparison of party manifestos is always a good starting point. Before doing that, a general comment on how Modi’s tenure has been covered is in order. Observers from across the world dubbed these elections as a referendum on Modi’s tenure, and much has been written about the rising intolerance, vigilante violence, and crackdown on dissent during Modi’s tenure. Domestically, Modi was widely criticised for his demonetisation move, which sent the economy into a shock. Modi’s frequent travels abroad received their share of criticism as well for being useless, and also became a template for hilarious internet memes

Coming to the manifestos of the two parties, both sought to cash in on political rhetoric and populist imagination. The manifesto of BJP read like a PR handout for its 5-year long tenure and sought to embellish its supposed tough stance on terrorism as the number one item on the manifesto titled ‘Nation First’. This section of the manifesto aimed to reinforce the rhetoric that India is continuously facing threats, both internal and external, by cashing in on the 14th February suicide attack in Kashmir, stoking anti-immigrant sentiment, and labelling social activists/dissenters as ‘left-wing extremists’. The manifesto also dedicated a whole section to what it calls ‘cultural heritage’, which shows the party’s intention to embark on a homogenisation drive in what is for intents and purposes a multi-national state. Lastly, the manifesto emphasised the aspect of development, and its aspirations to make India a global power by raising the issue of securing a permanent seat at the UNSC.

The manifestos appeared to have been written for the consumption of India’s tech-savvy Anglophone middle-class

On the other hand, the manifesto of the Congress party appeared radical in contrast to its rival. The key pledges the manifesto emphasised were a jobs revolution, universal healthcare, end to hate crimes, increasing defence spending, among other things. However, a closer reading of the party manifestos reveals that they are more similar than they appeared, as Irfan Ahmad had also pointed out in his Al Jazeera article in 2014. Things have not changed on that front; both manifestos raved about the discourse of development, the need to counter cross border terrorism and promise to acquire a permanent seat for India at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). On the disputed and politically rebellious region of Kashmir, both parties have pledged to take an assimilationist approach, albeit these approaches are phrased differently. The manifestos appeared to have been written for the consumption of India’s tech-savvy Anglophone middle-class, which over the years has become a site for the ideological fight between the right and the centre in Indian politics represented by the invocation of Ram Temple by the BJP and a hat-tip to tolerance by the Congress party.

Most of the pledges and promises the manifestos spoke of were absent from the speeches delivered by the politicians of the respective parties while on the campaign trail. The tenor of the election campaign appeared to be entirely divorced from the manifestos, more so from the Congress side. BJP, on its part, left no chance of polarising the electorate go begging.

Campaigning in the age of social media:

Political parties spent a staggering £3.8 billion in the 2014 parliamentary elections on election campaigning and other related activities. The amount spent during the recently concluded elections was almost double that and stood at £5.42 billion. A significant chunk of these funds was dedicated to digital campaigning over social media platforms, especially Facebook and Google ads. The massive spending on campaigning points towards the fact that elections in India revolve more around the spectacle of campaigns and are less dependent on what the parties have pledged in their respective election manifestos. Election campaigns in India are designed not only to entertain the audience, but also informally known to be opportunities to make a quick buck as audiences/voters are lured with promises of cash, liquor, and even food. It is hardly surprising that issues of critical importance for public policy are barely discussed on the campaign trail by the politicians in India. The recently concluded elections were no different.

Pressing matters of public policy were conveniently elided over by politicians in their campaigning and by the media in their coverage of the elections. Matters of public policy such as environmental pollution, rising inequality amongst different social classes, farmer crisis,   dispossession of tribal people from their lands were either wholly pushed out of the conversation or at best given half-hearted and short-lived attention. The issues that were highlighted by the media as the core issues of the elections were jobs and economic slowdown, and national security. Additionally, BJP’s muscular nationalism and its links to corruption have also been thrown in the mix by the sections of media sympathetic to the Congressi vision of India.

The move sought to project Modi as a politician with a clean image, with the interests of the poor at heart.

The discourse and rhetoric on the campaign trail from all sides was shrill vitriol and a public mudslinging competition. Election campaigning of the incumbent BJP revolved around a spectacle of securitisation and hyperbole. ‘Sacrifices’ of soldiers, surgical strikes inside Pakistani territory, and a right-wing brand of national loyalty were some of the continuously invoked themes throughout BJP’s election campaign. A BJP candidate even praised and hailed the assassin of Gandhi as a patriot. The polarising character of BJP’s campaign was further enhanced by a massively potent campaign of misinformation, primarily carried out through the messaging app WhatsApp. The party also undertook an ingenious PR campaign – led by Modi himself, when he added the prefix ‘Chowkidar’ (Watchman) to his Twitter handle. The move sought to project Modi as a politician with a clean image, with the interests of the poor at heart. While the move may not have succeeded in achieving that objective, it, however, succeeded in a far more significant way. The ‘Chowkidar’ move succeeded in shifting the focus of political discourse from serious political and economic issues to trivial matters of self-adorned labels; a trap Indian National Congress (INC) willingly walked into and remained caged in throughout the elections.

On the other hand, the election campaign of the Congress party from the beginning and throughout the election appeared to be interested in replicating the spectacular and entertaining model of campaigning, something the BJP seems to have perfected. The Congress party instead of sticking to discussing its manifesto pledges and making a persuasive argument as to why the voters should consider its manifesto succumbed to the tactics of the blitz, name-calling, and petty sloganeering. The President of the INC Rahul Gandhi repeatedly pointed fingers at the alleged connivance of Modi’s office in the mishandling of the Rafale fighter jet deal. Gandhi almost ritualistically dared Modi to debate him on the Rafale issue, beyond that Gandhi had no potent critique of BJP’s planned implementation of The Citizenship Bill and the National Register of Citizens, or its planned homogenisation drive at a national level. Gandhi appeared to be immensely pleased with himself for coming up with the ‘Chowkidar Chor Hai (Watchman is the Thief) slogan, which may have improved the acoustics of Congress election rallies, but miserably failed to project the Congress party as a viable alternative to the BJP – a development with far-reaching consequences for Indian polity in general..

A new ‘dangerous’ India?

An explanation of why Congress chose to ape BJP’s campaigning strategy, instead of forcefully putting forth its supposed ‘radical manifesto’ is that the policies that both these parties have pursued when in power since the early 1990s are qualitatively no different and are rooted in a neoliberal logic, which transcends the supposed divide of right and centre in Indian politics. Indian politics appears to have become a prisoner of what Marcuse called ‘liberal totalitarianism’, where the logic of neoliberal economic development has become the only acceptable and imaginable way to move forward. Neoliberal policies are unironically prescribed as the solution for problems whose roots lie in neoliberal thinking.

The failure of the Congress party and its allies to truly put progressive policies on the table and demonstrate the political will to pursue them forcefully has made a significant contribution in pushing Indian politics towards a dangerous trajectory. The legitimacy crisis of Congress has deepened in recent years to such an extent that the rhetoric of ‘If not Modi, then who?’ no longer sounds absurd, regardless of how frightening it is as a prospect. They call this the TINA; There is No Alternative.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that India is not a democracy in the truest sense of the word; it is a ‘quasi-democracy’ at best if I am to use Larry Diamond’s terminology, i.e., India is neither clearly democratic nor [overtly] authoritarian. The rise of BJP in such a ‘quasi-democracy’ makes the prospect of a ‘reverse wave of democracy’ in India very real. Snapping of internet services, curbs on press freedom, vigilante violence, systematic undermining of educational institutions all in the name of protecting the ‘national interest’ appear to confirm the trend of reversal in India.

Idreas Khandy is a PhD candidate at Lancaster University’s Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion

India, Populism, and the power of the ‘Other’

Adam Saraswati Rawlings, Comment Editor for SCAN

In the seventy two years since India gained its independence from the British, a distinct precedent has been espoused throughout political discourses is that of religious difference. Established in the very partition of India, a dichotomy has formed, and grown, between India’s Hindu majority and it’s religious minorities. This is most often historically India’s Muslim majority (which is destined to become the largest single population of Muslims in the world) but has from time to time turned to Sikhs (notably in the 1980s), and other communities. This narrative of religious difference is not a impenetrable barrier to religious cohesion in India, in fact it can be argued that India displays a more sophisticated model of religion conscious democracy, though the ever growing populist narrative of India’s politics, this assessment grows weaker and weaker.

In recent years a rise in violence against India’s Muslim communities, particularly beef vigilantism and actions against ‘love jihad’, has coincided with the premiership of Narendra Modi, of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). While Hindu Nationalism has been present in India since before the nation’s independence, the recent spike in violent Hindu Nationalism is in no small feat connected to the populist politics that saw a BJP victory in the 2014 general election. Now that India is in the process of electing and announcing the results of its 2019 general election, a trend is clear. The BJP are playing off of fears embedded within India’s political conscious tied up in present fears of the ‘other’. One only has to look as far as the speech given by Uttar Pradesh’s Chief Minister, Yogi Adityanath, in March of 2017, when he assumed office, to see the narrative the BJP is using to strike fear into the heart of its votership.

This year Modi’s campaigning has heavily focused on Indian security, deviating from his previous campaign which centred itself on economic and social reform, essentially playing off the recent unrest in Indian controlled Kashmir. The party has used the climate in global media of Islam at the forefront of negative press, to push the idea that Hindus are under threat, both from the nations that border India, and increasingly from the Muslim citizens from within. Modi has used this, along with what many describe as the BJP’s historically anti-Muslim narrative, to whip up the emotions of India’s working class Hindu voters to rally behind him once again. The frank ways in which Modi has used Kashmir in his campaigning has shown a populism which banks on a continued culture of unrest and distrust between India’s religious communities. Further, the unrest of Kashmir’s internal politics only serves to feed into the carefully curated image the BJP and wider Hindu Nationalist movement has crafted of India as a nation under threat from the ‘other’. The sacred ideal of India as a Hindu nation, though not removed from the contexts of India or Hinduism, are manipulated and projected to show the BJP as the protectors of India’s integrity as a Hindu homeland. The recent murder of a BJP politician in Kashmir and the widespread boycott of the 2019 elections in Kashmir have only added to this.

The language the BJP increasingly uses not only glorifies the Hinduness of India, but serves to place the minority, especially the Muslim minority, as an integral threat to the foundations of the nation. In recent times the use of hate speech from BJP politicians has reportedly shot up to a head spinning 500% on what it has been in previous years, with Amit Shah the party president using words like ‘termites’ to describe Muslim immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh.

The real danger of this rhetoric is how much of the Indian polity is now beginning to buy into it as legitimate and how successful it has been in inspiring Islamophobic violence. In BJP strongholds like Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, and Gujarat the increase in Hindu Nationalist violence has ballooned since the election of Modi in 2014 and by 2018 had rapidly increased still. Such violence has even permeated India’s usually apolitical film industry, with the blockbuster Padmaavat sparking major controversy and threats of violence due to concerns from emboldened Hindu Nationalist vigilantes over Hindu-Muslim relationships shown on screen. The populist narrative projected by the BJP fuels concern and aggression over the perceived threat of the other has bled into the understanding of what nationality and Hinduness is to a large swathe of Hindus, particularly those from lower income backgrounds who make up a large number of those involved in Hindutva violence. The BJP’s contribution and captainship to the idea of Muslims as a distinct and threatening other is making India an increasingly unsafe, unequal, and ever dangerous country.

Ultimately the othering of Muslims is not something unique to India, evidenced by the social climate of the Western world, or to the BJP given the diversity of Hindu Nationalist groups in India. What is distinct though, is the amount of influence and power that the BJP has to control and manipulate this narrative to draw support for their party, as well as manipulate the social conditions of India, especially rural and less economically prosperous parts of India.